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CVE-2024-43378

· Published 16/08/2024 02:15 · Modified 19/08/2024 13:00

Labels: CVE-2024-43378 2024-08-16CVE-2024-43378CWE-256[email protected]

Essential information

Published
16/08/2024 02:15
Modified
19/08/2024 13:00
Author
Creator
CVSS
7.8 HIGH (v3.1)
CISA KEV
No
CWE
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

CVSS metrics

Description

calamares-nixos-extensions provides Calamares branding and modules for NixOS, a distribution of GNU/Linux. Users who installed NixOS through the graphical installer who used manual disk partitioning to create a setup where the system was booted via legacy BIOS rather than UEFI; some disk partitions are encrypted; but the partitions containing either `/` or `/boot` are unencrypted; have their LUKS disk encryption key file in plain text either in `/crypto_keyfile.bin`, or in a CPIO archive attached to their NixOS initrd. `nixos-install` is not affected, nor are UEFI installations, nor was the default automatic partitioning configuration on legacy BIOS systems. The problem has been fixed in calamares-nixos-extensions 0.3.17, which was included in NixOS. The current installer images for the NixOS 24.05 and unstable (24.11) channels are unaffected. The fix reached 24.05 at 2024-08-13 20:06:59 UTC, and unstable at 2024-08-15 09:00:20 UTC. Installer images downloaded before those times may be vulnerable. The best solution for affected users is probably to back up their data and do a complete reinstallation. However, the mitigation procedure in GHSA-3rvf-24q2-24ww should work solely for the case where `/` is encrypted but `/boot` is not. If `/` is unencrypted, then the `/crypto_keyfile.bin` file will need to be deleted in addition to the remediation steps in the previous advisory. This issue is a partial regression of CVE-2023-36476 / GHSA-3rvf-24q2-24ww, which was more severe as it applied to the default configuration on BIOS systems.

NVD status

Status
Awaiting Analysis — CVE has been recently published to the CVE List and has been received by the NVD.
Source
[email protected]
NVD
View on NVD

References